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REDUCING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: A
GLASS-STEAGALL SPLIT OF ADVISORY
AND CONSULTING SERVICES OF PROXY
ADVISORY FIRMS
ABSTRACT
This Note explores a solution to the potential problem with proxy
advisory firms that involves an inherent conflict of interest arising from the
structure of two services—advisory and consulting services—offered at
certain proxy advisory firms in the United States. The solution proposed in
this paper applies a Glass-Steagall framework to breakup these two services
of the proxy advisory firms. In theory, this would eliminate the inherent
conflicts of interest.
INTRODUCTION
Shareholders1 of a public corporation are the cornerstone of corporate
governance in the United States. Corporate governance decisions are
typically voted by shareholders through a “proxy,” which is an individual or
instrument that has legal authorization to vote on behalf of a shareholder at a
public corporation’s annual shareholder meeting. 2 Due to the increasing
number of corporations that have multiple proxy proposal issues on which to
vote every year, the voting process has become more complex.3 The rise of
the complicated voting process has necessitated the need for assistance in the
process.4 Proxy advisory firms—companies that research shareholder issues
and provide investors with recommendations on the best way to vote—have
1. A shareholder (also referred to as a stockholder) is an owner in a corporation. Specifically,
a “shareholder is a person, company, or institution that owns at least one share of a company’s stock,
which is known as equity.” Because they are owners in a corporation, they make money when the
business succeeds, but lose money when the business fails. In accordance to a corporation’s charter
and bylaws:
shareholders traditionally enjoy the following rights: the right to inspect the company’s
books and records; to power to sue the corporation for misdeeds of its directors and/or
officers; the right to vote on key corporate matters, such as naming board directors and
deciding whether or not to greenlight potential mergers; the entitlement to receive
dividends; the right to attend annual meetings, either in person or via conference calls;
the right to vote on key matters by proxy, either through mail-in ballots, or online voting
platforms, if they’re unable to attend voting meetings in person; the right to claim a
proportionate allocation of proceeds if a company liquidates its assets.
Adam Hayes, Shareholder, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shareholder.asp
(last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
2. See Shareholder Proxy: Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL, https://www.
upcounsel.com/shareholder-proxy (last visited Feb. 3, 2021).
3. See Edward B. Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, FAC. SCHOLARSHIP
PENN (July 21, 2015), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1458.
4. See Chester S. Spatt, Proxy Advisory Firms, Governance, Failure, and Regulation, HARV.
L. SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (June 25, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2019/06/25/proxy-advisory-firms-governance-failure-and-regulation/.
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greatly reduced the time and money that institutional investors 5 need to
spend. 6 However, given the dual-nature of these proxy advisory firms
providing both consulting services and voting advisory services to the same
companies, the potential for conflicts of interests has increased.7
To avoid these conflicts of interests, this Note proposes that Congress
should apply a framework that will split up these proxy advisory firms by
forcing these established firms to choose consulting services or advisory
services, but not both.8 Part I of this Note discusses the current state of proxy
advisory firms, including both the advisory and the consulting aspects of the
industry. Part II discusses the basis for the recommendation, drawing from
the history and rationale of the Glass-Steagall Act. Part III discusses the final
recommendation, focusing on how applying a framework that splits up proxy
advisory firms will reduce conflicts of interests and produce more
competition within the proxy advisory market.
I.

CURRENT STATE OF ADVISORY AND CONSULTING
SERVICES IN PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS

The public corporation shareholder voting process can be complicated.
Corporate governance is anchored on the concept of shareholder engagement
with public corporations to hold management and the board of directors
accountable for their performance.9 Shareholders vote on many issues that
directly impact the trajectory of a public corporation’s performance, both
financially and culturally. 10 Some examples of the many issues on which
shareholders vote include elections of the company’s board of directors,
changes in internal operations, shifts in company priorities, restructurings,
executive compensation, and mergers or acquisitions of other companies.11
Although there are still active retail investors (i.e., individual investors), the
majority of investors have their ownership tied up in institutional investors
that manage securities on behalf of individual investors.12 These institutional

5. See Sam Bourgi, Who Are Institutional Investors?, MUTUAL FUND EDUC. (Dec. 18, 2018),
https://mutualfunds.com/education/who-are-institutional-investors/.
6. See David Larker, The Big Thumb on the Scale: An Overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 14, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018
/06/14/the-big-thumb-on-the-scale-an-overview-of-the-proxy-advisory-industry/.
7. See Timothy Doyle, The Conflicted Role of Proxy Advisors, AM. COUNCIL FOR CAP.
FORMATION (May 2018), http://accfcorpgov.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ACCF_TheConflicted-Role-of-Proxy-Advisors.pdf.
8. See Kimberly Amadeo, Glass Steagall Act of 1933, Its Purpose and Repeal, BALANCE (July
10, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/glass-steagall-act-definition-purpose-and-repeal-3305850.
9. Edward B. Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, FAC. SCHOLARSHIP
PENN (July 21, 2015), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1458.
10. Spatt, supra note 4.
11. How Does the Shareholder Voting Process Work?, MAIN ST. INVS. COALITION (Dec. 10,
2018), https://mainstreetinvestors.org/how-does-the-shareholder-voting-process-work/.
12. Bourgi, supra note 5.
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investors include firms such as hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds,
and insurance companies.13
A. PURPOSE OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS
Following the passage of The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), 14 institutional investors that handle shares for private
investors are required to vote at all shareholder meetings.15 Clients that have
their assets tied up in institutional investors give those institutional investors
the right to vote on shareholder proposals on their behalf. 16 In 2014, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) issued Staff
Legal Bulletin No. 20 that confirmed that these institutional investors have a
fiduciary duty to support shareholder voting by stating, “as a fiduciary, an
investment advisor owes each of its clients a duty of care and loyalty with
respect to services undertaken on the client’s behalf, including proxy
voting.”17 Proxy voting involves one person or firm voting on behalf of a
shareholder of a corporation who may not be able to attend a shareholder
meeting.18 This SEC guidance encourages advisers to take a more active role
in fulfilling shareholders’ voting responsibilities by pushing advisers to
reassess and review compliance and proxy voting policies to ensure that they
comply with the Proxy Voting Rule19 and are effective.20 The Proxy Voting
Rule stems from a 2003 SEC regulation that requires institutional investors
to disclose all of their proxy voting policies, along with all of their vote counts
on all proxy proposals.21
Proxy voting by institutional investors comes at a cost to both the
institutional investor and the client. 22 It requires a significant amount of

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Doyle, supra note 7.
Id.
Spatt, supra note 3.
SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (IM/CF), Proxy Voting: Proxy Voting Responsibilities of
Investment Advisors and Availability of Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Advisory
Firms, (June 30, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm#_ftn1 [hereinafter SEC Staff
Legal Bulletin No. 20]. In this context, “investment advisor” is the role of the institutional investor.
18. Will Kenton, Proxy Vote, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/proxyvote.asp (last visited Dec. 26, 2019).
19. See Rule 206(4)-6 under the Advisers Act. In the Proxy Voting Rule, the SEC states that “it
is a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, practice, or course of business for an investment
advisor registered or required to be registered with the Commission to exercise voting authority
with respect to client securities unless the adviser, among other things, adopts and implements
written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that the investment advisor
votes proxies in the best interest of its clients.” Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20, supra note 17.
20. See David A. Katz, Important Proxy Advisor Developments, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Sept. 29, 2014), http://perma.cc/7LKJ-UYHG.
21. David Larcker, The Big Thumb on the Scale: An Overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 14, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2018/06/14/the-big-thumb-on-the-scale-an-overview-of-the-proxy-advisory-industry/.
22. Id.
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resources, such as time and expertise, that many small or mid-size
institutional investor firms do not have.23 The largest institutional investors,
such as BlackRock, Vanguard Asset Management, State Street Global
Advisors, BNY Mellon Investment Management, EMEA Limited, and J.P.
Morgan Asset Management, are large enough to have the resources to
properly research various shareholder proposals, but even these large firms
require assistance.24 Specifically, working through the vast amounts of data
can be time-consuming and burdensome, causing many institutional
investors to look to third-party validators to consolidate the available data to
make it easier to understand.25 To assist in this data problem and in the proxy
voting processes, many institutional investors require the services of proxy
advisory firms to act as the third-party validator.26
Institutional investors require proxy advisory firms more now than ever
before. The impact of institutional investors has steadily increased, as they
now own more than seventy percent of the stock in over one thousand of the
United States’ largest corporations. 27 Additionally, institutional investors
have a higher voter participation rate at a ninety-one percent voting rate
compared with regular retail investors who vote at a rate of twenty-nine
percent. 28 With the “ever-widening assortment of corporate, social, and
political issues” on which shareholders can vote, the need for proxy advisory
firms has become more prevalent.29
B. MAIN PLAYERS IN THE PROXY ADVISORY BUSINESS
The two largest U.S. proxy advisory firms, Glass Lewis & Co. (Glass
Lewis) and Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS), dominate the
industry and together control ninety-seven percent of the market share. 30
Both of these firms offer advisory services that assist registered corporations
in evaluating data on topics such as voting behavior, compensation plans, risk
management, and corporate governance.31

23. Id.
24. Largest Institutional Investors, WALL ST. PREP, https://www.wallstreetprep.com
/knowledge/largest-institutional-investors/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2019).
25. Doyle, supra note 7.
26. Spatt, supra note 4.
27. Sharon Hannes, Brave New World: A Proposal for Institutional Investors, 16
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 245, 248-49 (2015).
28. Larcker, supra note 6.
29. Katz, supra note 20.
30. Andrew Ackerman, SEC Takes Action Aimed at Proxy Advisers for Shareholders, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 21, 2019, 2:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-to-take-action-aimed-at-proxyadvisers-for-shareholders-11566399808.
31. Stephen J. Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV.
649, 653 (2009).
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1. Glass Lewis
Glass Lewis has an extensive client base, including the world’s largest
pension funds, mutual funds, and asset managers that collectively manage
over $35 trillion in assets.32 It provides data analytics and research reports,
along with voting recommendations to its large institutional investor
clients.33 It also offers services such as advisory of share recall programs,34
but its core product is the proxy advisory service. 35 It currently holds
approximately thirty-seven percent of the proxy advisory market share and is
the second largest proxy advisory firm in the country. 36 Glass Lewis
describes its business as “a leading, independent governance services firm
that provides proxy research and vote management services to more than
1,300 clients throughout the world,” and states that “[w]hile institutional
investor clients use Glass Lewis research primarily to help them make proxy
voting decisions, they also use Glass Lewis research when engaging with
companies before and after shareholder meetings.”37
2. ISS
The ISS proxy advisory business is similar to Glass Lewis, but differs in
that ISS has an additional component to its business that has become a “hot
bed” for potential conflicts of interest: a consulting services arm.38 ISS has a
dominant position in the market, claiming “over 1,700 institutional clients
managing $26 trillion in assets, including 24 of the top 25 mutual funds, the
top 25 asset managers and 17 of the top 25 public pension funds.” 39 It
32. Company Overview, GLASS LEWIS, https://www.glasslewis.com/company-overview/ (last
visited Oct. 13, 2019).
33. Id.
34. “Powered by [its] objective analysis of corporate governance issues, economic and financial
matters and M&A transactions, the Glass Lewis Share Recall service enables lenders to maximize
their share-lending program by facilitating the selective recall of shares for important proxies. Share
Recall empowers [clients] to efficiently maximize the value of [their] share-lending program, while
still being able to vote on key meetings. Every day, Share Recall’s proprietary algorithm calculates
the materiality of the most-recently announced meetings of approximately 5,000 companies. After
weighing the meeting type and a variety of governance factors, [Glass Lewis classifies] each
meeting into one of three materiality categories based on the level of importance. Subscribers to the
Share Recall service receive a daily email or XML data feed alert notifying them when a company
in their holdings issues a proxy with a record date in the next 20 days, as well as the materiality
score of the company, providing institutional investors time to cost-effectively recall shares.” Share
Recall, GLASS LEWIS, https://www.glasslewis.com/share-recall/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2021).
35. Doyle, supra note 7.
36. Glass Lewis, CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., http://www.execcomp.org/Issues/Issue/proxyadvisory-firms/glass-lewis (last visited Feb. 1, 2021).
37. See Best Practice Principles for Providers of Shareholder Voting Research & Analysis:
Glass Lewis Statement of Compliance for the Period of 1 January 2019 through 31 December 2019,
GLASS LEWIS (May 2020), http://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/GLCompliance-Statement-2019.pdf.
38. Doyle, supra note 7.
39. Stephen J. Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV.
649, 652–53 (2009).
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currently claims to have approximately sixty percent of the total market
share.40
The nature of proxy advisory firms can lead to potential conflicts of
interest, specifically around ISS providing proxy voting advisory
recommendations while simultaneously offering consulting services to the
same companies.41 Glass Lewis does not offer consulting services, so there
is less potential for conflicts of interest.42 There are genuine concerns that
ISS could potentially rate or give a negative recommendation to a company,
and then turn around and push its consulting services onto the same company,
which now seeks to increase its rating or recover from a negative voting
recommendation imposed by ISS. 43 Ira Millstein, an expert on corporate
governance, vividly described the flawed business structure:
It provides structural “standards” for corporate governance, privately
prepared by unidentified people, pursuant to unidentified processes, and
asks us to take its word that it is all fair and balanced. I tried to dig behind
the soothing assurances, but couldn’t find enough detail to convince me that
a devil didn’t lie in the details of how this private standard-setting was put
together. And then ISS provides company ratings, based on these privatelyset standards, creating a tendency on the part of those that have received a
poor rating to pay for a consultancy by the private standard setter, on how
to improve that rating. I see this as a vicious cycle.44

ISS even acknowledged this perceived conflict in its RiskMetrics45 2009
10-k by stating:
[T]here may be a perceived conflict of interest between the services we
provide to institutional clients and the services, including our Compensation
Advisory Services, provided to certain corporate clients. For example, when
we provide corporate governance services46 to a corporate client and at the
same time provide proxy vote recommendations to institutional clients

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Doyle, supra note 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., A CALL FOR CHANGE IN THE PROXY ADVISORY INDUSTRY STATUS
QUO 7 (2011), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ProxyAdvisoryWhitePaper02072
011.pdf [hereinafter A Call for Change].
45. In January of 2007, RiskMetrics Group, a financial risk management firm, acquired
Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS). In March of 2010, MSCI Inc. (formerly Morgan
Stanley Capital International and MSCI Barra) acquired RiskMetrics, and thus owned ISS. See Press
Release, RiskMetrics Group Acquires of Institutional Shareholder Services, Spectrum Equity (Jan.
2007),
https://www.spectrumequity.com/news/riskmetrics-group-acquires-of-institutionalshareholder-services. See Press Release, MSCI to buy RiskMetrics for $1.55 billion, Thomson
Reuters (Mar. 1, 2010, 6:33 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-riskmetrics-msci-idU
STRE6201S420100301.
46. In this context, “corporate governance services” refers to the consulting services offered by
ISS. RiskMetrics Group, Inc., 2009 10-K form, Retrieved from https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1295172/000104746909001976/a2190980z10-k.htm [23-24].
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regarding that corporation’s proxy items, there may be a perception that we
may treat that corporation more favorably due to its use of our services.47

Further, if a public client of ISS that utilizes the proxy voting services
does not also purchase its consulting services, ISS could potentially “retaliate
through their recommendations against operating companies that do not
purchase their services.”48
C. OTHER BIG INDUSTRY PLAYERS
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street are three of the largest
institutional investors in the world. 49 These firms specialize in indirect
passive investing, specifically in exchange-traded funds (ETF), which are
entities that pool together many different investments and are “tracked” to an
index (e.g., the S&P 500).50 Essentially, an individual or institutional investor
is investing in an index that contains many stocks rather than picking and
choosing specific stocks.51 These three investing firms manage $14 trillion in
index investments and cast approximately a quarter of the votes of all S&P
500 companies in the U.S. 52 As more money generally pours into index
investments, index investment firms like BlackRock, Vanguard, and State
Street vote more proxies per year in the largest S&P 500 corporations.53 As
these firms gain more influence in proxy votes, they look to proxy advisory
firms like Glass Lewis and ISS. 54 Proxy advisory clients are increasingly
following the recommendations of both ISS and Glass Lewis.55 For example,
State Street voted for 88.2% of ISS’s “For” Recommendations and for 80.3%
of ISS’s “Against” recommendations in 2017. 56 This indicates a high
correlation between the votes of these larger ETF investment firms (including
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street) and the recommendations of both
Glass Lewis and ISS.57 Though it is possible that these ETF firms would have
voted the same way as the proxy advisory firm recommendations even if they
were not clients of Glass Lewis or ISS, one can infer an increasing influence

47. Id. [RiskMetrics Group, Inc., 2009 10-K form, Retrieved from https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1295172/000104746909001976/a2190980z10-k.htm [23-24].]
48. Spatt, supra note 4.
49. Largest Institutional Investors, WALL ST. PREP, https://www.wallstreetprep
.com/knowledge/largest-institutional-investors/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2019).
50. Dan Caplinger, What is an ETF?, MOTLEY FOOL (Aug. 7, 2019, 3;57 PM),
https://www.fool.com/investing/etf/what-is-an-etf-exchange-traded-fund.aspx.
51. Id.
52. Owen Walker, BlackRock, Vanguard and SSGA Tighten Hold on US Boards, FIN. TIMES
(June 15, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/046ec082-d713-3015-beaf-c7fa42f3484a.
53. Doyle, supra note 7.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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from the proxy advisory firms through the high correlation of voting
patterns.58
D. REGULATION OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS
Proxy advisory firms are subject to very little regulation despite their
increasingly important role within large corporations’ governance
practices.59 On August 21, 2019, the SEC held an open meeting to address
the problem of the increasing reliance on proxy advisory firms by
institutional investors that could lead to further dominance of proxy advisory
firms over corporations.60 In its guidance, the SEC stated that proxy advisory
firms need to be more transparent about how they reach their
recommendations regarding shareholder proposals.61 The guidance focused
on what constitutes a “solicitation” under Section 14 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 193462 (the “Exchange Act,” and specifically the “federal
proxy rules”).63 An investment advisor who typically hires a proxy advisory
firm like Glass Lewis or ISS is considered a fiduciary by the SEC and
therefore owes its investor a duty of care and loyalty regarding all actions it
performs on its investors’ behalf, including proxy voting.64 Proxy advisory
firms assist in fulfilling institutional investors’ fiduciary duty to their
clients.65 The SEC has a continued view that proxy voting advice provided
by the proxy advisory firms constitutes a “solicitation” under the Exchange
Act.66 Rule 14a-1 of the Exchange Act states that a “solicitation” includes a
“communication to security holders under circumstances reasonably
calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a
proxy.” 67 By interpreting “solicitation” to include proxy advisory firms’
advice to their clients, the SEC is subjecting proxy advisory firms to the
federal proxy advisory rules in the Exchange Act.68
58. Id.
59. Spatt, supra note 4.
60. 17 C.F.R. pt. 241 (2012), Comm’n Interpretation & Guidance Regarding the Applicability
of the Proxy Rules to Proxy Voting Advice, Exchange Act Release No. 86721, 2019 WL 8587445
(Aug. 21, 2019).
61. Brian Croce, SEC lays out proxy advisory firms’ responsibilities, PENSION & INVS. (Aug.
21, 2019 03:16 PM), https://www.pionline.com/regulation/sec-lays-out-proxy-advisory-firmsresponsibilities.
62. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2; See Croce, supra note 60.
63. Croce, supra note 61.
64. Investment advisor Proxy Voting Guidance, 17 CFR Parts 271 and 276, SEC Guidance
(Aug. 21, 2019).
65. 17 C.F.R. pt. 241 (2012), Comm’n Interpretation & Guidance Regarding the Applicability
of the Proxy Rules to Proxy Voting Advice, Exchange Act Release No. 86721, 2019 WL 8587445
(Aug. 21, 2019).
66. Id.
67. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1.
68. See Croce supra note 60. The SEC recognized that proxy voting advice likely falls within
the definition of a solicitation and instead chose to exempt such solicitations from the information
and filing requirements of the proxy rules. See generally, Shareholder Participation Adopting
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The primary legal framework that governs proxy advisory firms is The
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 (the 1940 Act).69 Under the 1940 Act, a
firm is considered an “Investment Advisor” if they get paid compensation to
provide advice on anything relating to the selling or buying securities or
general analysis of securities.70 In the SEC’s 2010 guidance, it stated that
“proxy advisory firms receive compensation for providing voting
recommendations and analysis on matters submitted for a vote at shareholder
meetings” and that they “meet the definition of investment advisor because
they, for compensation, engage in the business of issuing reports or analyses
Release, enacting what is now Exchange Act Rule 14a-2(b)(3) to exempt the furnishing of proxy
voting advice by any advisor to any other person with whom the advisor has a business relationship
from the informational and filing requirements of the federal proxy rules, provided the conditions
of the rule are met. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(3). Rule 14a-2(b)(3) requires that:
(i) the advisor renders financial advice in the ordinary course of his business;
(ii) the advisor discloses to the recipient of the advice any significant relationship with the registrant
or any of its affiliates, or a security holder proponent of the matter on which advice is given, as well
as any material interests of the advisor in such matter;
(iii) the advisor receives no special commission or remuneration for furnishing the proxy voting
advice from any person other than a recipient of the advice and other persons who receive similar
advice under this subsection; and
(iv) the proxy voting advice is not furnished on behalf of any person soliciting proxies or on behalf
of a participant in an election subject to the provisions of § 240.14a-12(c).
69. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-1.
70. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-2(a)(11), which codifies Investment advisors Act of 1940, § 202(a)(11),
and states:
“Investment advisor” means any person who, for compensation, engages in the business
of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or
who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses
or reports concerning securities; but does not include (A) a bank, or any bank holding
company as defined in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 which is not an
investment company, except that the term “investment advisor” includes any bank or
bank holding company to the extent that such bank or bank holding company serves or
acts as an investment advisor to a registered investment company, but if, in the case of a
bank, such services or actions are performed through a separately identifiable department
or division, the department or division, and not the bank itself, shall be deemed to be the
investment advisor; … (C) any broker or dealer whose performance of such services is
solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no
special compensation therefor; … (E) any person whose advice, analyses or reports relate
to no securities other than securities which are direct obligations of or obligations
guaranteed as to principal or interest by the United States, or securities issued or
guaranteed by corporations in which the United States has a direct or indirect interest
which shall have been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to section
3(a)(12) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as exempted securities for the purposes
of that Act; (F) any nationally recognized statistical rating organization, as that term is
defined in section 3(a)(62) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, unless such
organization engages in issuing recommendations as to purchasing, selling, or holding
securities or in managing assets, consisting in whole or in part of securities, on behalf of
others;;1 (G) any family office, as defined by rule, regulation, or order of the
Commission, in accordance with the purposes of this subchapter; or (H) such other
persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as the Commission may designate by rules
and regulations or order.
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concerning securities and providing advice to others as to the value of
securities.” 71 Additionally, investment advisors typically have to register
with the SEC if they manage $25 million or more of assets.72 Proxy advisory
firms do not fall into this category because they typically do not manage their
clients’ assets, but they still may choose to register with the SEC if they fall
into one of the exemptions from registration prohibition provided in Rule
203A-2 under the Act.73 Proxy advisory firms can make a valid argument that
it should fall under the exemption by having at least one pension fund plan,
and would therefore qualify as a “Pension Consultant.”74
There is a growing sense among experts in the voting industry that the
concentration of proxy advisory firms has led to the firms becoming “shadow
regulators.”75 Shadow regulators are “entities that have enough influence in
the system that they can dictate major changes in business practices with
significant effect but little responsibility.”76 This occurs when one entity in a
complex industry system can drive significant change through the whole
system or network of that particular industry.77 Because proxy advisory firms
control so much of the voting process, they are known as shadow regulators.78
Due to this concern of shadow regulation, many scholars and heads of
businesses have spoken out against allowing proxy advisory firms to be
shadow regulators. For example, former SEC commissioner Daniel M.
Gallagher stated in the 2013 that:

71. SEC, Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Release No. 34-62495 (July 14, 2010).
72. Advisers Act Section 203A, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3a.
73. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3a, which codifies, Section 203A(a) of the Act, states:
(a) Advisers subject to State authorities
(1) In general
No investment advisor that is regulated or required to be regulated as an investment advisor in the
State in which it maintains its principal office and place of business shall register under section 80b3 of this title, unless the investment advisor—
(A) has assets under management of not less than $25,000,000, or such higher amount as the
Commission may, by rule, deem appropriate in accordance with the purposes of this subchapter.
74. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-2, which codifies Advisers Act Rule 203A-2(b), states:
(1) An investment advisor that is a “pension consultant,” as defined in this section, with respect to
assets of plans having an aggregate value of at least $200,000,000.
(2) An investment advisor is a pension consultant, for purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, if
the investment advisor provides investment advice to:
(i) Any employee benefit plan described in section 3(3) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) [29 U.S.C. 1002(3)];
(ii) Any governmental plan described in section 3(32) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. 1002(32)); or
(iii) Any church plan described in section 3(33) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. 1002(33)).
75. Doyle, supra note 7.
76. John Strong, Submission to the Productivity Commission on the Study of Regulator
Behaviour with Small Business, STRONG STRATEGIES (Mar. 19, 2013), https://www.pc.gov
.au/inquiries/completed/small-business/submissions/submissions-test/submission-counter/sub019small-business.pdf.
77. Id.
78. See Doyle, supra note 7.
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I believe that the Commission should fundamentally review the role and
regulation of proxy advisory firms and explore possible reforms, including,
but not limited to, requiring them to follow a universal code of conduct,
ensuring that their recommendations are designed to increase shareholder
value, increasing the transparency of their methods, ensuring that conflicts
of interest are dealt with appropriately, and increasing their overall
accountability. I am not alone in raising these issues…what European
policymakers and our own Congress have highlighted is that changes need
to be made so that proxy advisors are subject to oversight and accountability
79
commensurate
with
their
role.

One of the largest problems with this “quasi-regulator” status is the cost
on the companies that are the clients of proxy advisory firms. 80 Proxy
advisory firms are constantly changing and updating policies and
recommendations around social and environmental issues, making it difficult
for client companies to stay up to date on the changes.81 When proxy advisory
firms make a policy on environmental or social issues that affect many of
their clients in many different industries, client companies can scramble to
try to adhere to that policy change.82 In doing so, client companies can bear
tremendous costs, and can potentially lose sight of shareholder value in the
process.83
Politically charged proxy proposals by proxy advisory firms such as
environmental, social, and governance solutions can hinder shareholder
returns and inadvertently turn corporate policy-making political.84 A 2017
study by Harvard University professor Joseph Kalt and economist Adel Turki
focused on the impact climate change policies have had on proxy shareholder
proposals in recent years.85 The study showed that companies that adhered to
the recommendation of proxy advisory firms on political proposals such as
climate change do not perform better based on market indices both in the
short-term and long-term.86 Over one hundred million retail investors, who
hold more than $16.9 trillion in assets, 87 are particularly hurt by these

79. Daniel M. Gallagher, Remarks at Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance
Professionals, SEC (July 11, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch071113dmghtm.
80. See Doyle, supra note 7.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Jeff Patch, Curb the Power of Shady Proxy Advisory Firms!, WASH. EXAMINER (July
16, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/curb-the-power-ofshady-proxy-advisory-firms.
85. See Joseph Kalt, Political, Social, and Environmental Shareholder Resolutions: Do they
Create or Destroy Shareholder Value?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 17, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/17/political-social-and-environmental-shareholderresolutions-do-they-create-or-destroy-shareholder-value/.
86. Id.
87. Patch, supra note 84.
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political proxy proposals that proxy advisory firms are recommending
because they are not given an adequate voice. 88 The majority of proxy
recommendations are followed because institutional investors, who hold
thirty-eight percent of the shareholder votes, 89 tend to follow the proxy
advisory firm’s recommendation.90 If the majority of these proxy proposals
have an underlying political agenda, then there is a good chance they will be
passed leading to shareholders, particularly retail investors, losing value.91
II. HISTORY AND RATIONALE OF GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
Prior to 1933, a single bank could perform both retail banking functions
and investment banking functions.92 To better understand Glass-Steagall and
the reasoning for the legislation, a basic understanding of investment banking
and retail banking is required.
A. INVESTMENT BANKING BACKGROUND
Investment banking functions include underwriting, mergers &
acquisitions (M&A) advisory, sales & trading, equity research, and asset
management services.93 Investment bankers perform underwriting services
by assisting in raising capital for corporations (e.g., through initial public
offerings 94 ) by selling bonds or stocks of the corporation to multiple
investors.95 M&A advisory includes helping corporations—both on the “sellside” (representing the company being purchased) and “buy-side”
(representing the company doing the purchasing)—evaluate and negotiate
with the other party during an acquisition of another company.96 Sales &
Trading involves buying and selling securities on the secondary market (i.e.,
investors buy and sell securities they already own or have previously been
purchased during an IPO).97 Equity research groups provide research reports
that can be purchased by investors and corporations to assist in making

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Patch, supra note 84.
See Doyle, supra note 7.
Patch, supra note 84.
Amadeo, supra note 8.
Investment Banking: Overview of the investment banking industry, CORPORATE FIN. INST.,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/careers/jobs/investment-banking-overview/ (last
visited Feb. 1, 2021).
94. An initial public offering (IPO) refers to the process of offering shares of a private
corporation to the public in a new stock issuance. This usually entails listing the stock on one of the
major exchanges. Jason Fernando, Initial Public Offering (IPO), INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 1, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ipo.asp.
95. CORPORATE FIN. INST, supra note 93.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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investment decisions. 98 Asset managers provide investment strategies for
institutions and investors that best utilize their investments.99
Investment banking functions differ from retail banking functions. Retail
banking provides services to consumers such as individuals and families,
primarily through credit (e.g., underwriting a loan), deposits, and money
management. 100 Retail bankers provide individual consumers with credit
products such as mortgages, credit cards, and car loans.101 Retail bankers also
assist in setting up deposit accounts for consumers such as savings accounts
or certificates of deposits. 102 Consumers can also purchase money
management products such as checking accounts and debit cards from retail
bankers.103
B. HISTORY OF THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
In the aftermath of the stock market crash in 1929 that kicked off the
Great Depression, Congress became concerned that the consumer deposits
from the retail function of the banks were put in an unnecessarily risky
position as bankers on the investment banking side continually sold, bought,
and underwrote inherently risky securities. 104 From the time of the stock
market crash in 1929 to 1932, approximately 5,795 banks failed with an
additional 4,000 failures in 1933. 105 Consumers were withdrawing their
money from banks at a rapid speed. President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared
a four-day bank holiday, closing the entire U.S. banking system, and
subsequently passed the Emergency Banking Act of 1933106 to help restore
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Amadeo, supra note 8.
Id.
Kimberly Amadeo, Retail Banking, Its Types and Economic Impact, BALANCE (Nov. 30,
2020), https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-retail-banking-3305885.
103. Id.
104. Joseph Jude Norton, Up Against “The Wall”: Glass-Steagall and the Dilemma of a
Deregulated (“Reregulated”) Banking Environment, 42 BUS. LAW. 327, 329 (1987).
105. Oonagh McDonald, The Repeal of the Glass Steagall Act: Myth and Reality, CATO INST.,
POL’Y ANALYSIS NO. 804 (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.cato.org/publications/policyanalysis/repeal-glass-steagall-act-myth-reality.
106. The Act, which also broadened the powers of the president during a banking crisis, was
divided into five sections:
Title I expanded presidential authority during a banking crisis, including retroactive
approval of the banking holiday and regulation of all banking functions, including ‘any
transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit between or payments by banking
institutions as defined by the President, and export, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of
gold or silver coin.’
Title II gave the comptroller of the currency the power to restrict the operations of a bank
with impaired assets and to appoint a conservator, who ‘shall take possession of the
books, records, and assets of every description of such bank, and take such action as may
be necessary to conserve the assets of such bank pending further disposition of its
business.’

510

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 15

public confidence in the banking system.107 Many consumers returned much
of the money that was previously withdrawn, but widespread public
pessimism still existed with regard to the banks in the United States.108 To
address this risk that contributed to the stock market crash and to restore
public confidence in banks, Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Act in
1933.109 One of the primary reasons for passing the Glass-Steagall Act was
to counteract the potential risks that could arise when commercial banks
representing consumers partake in the risky securities business of which
investment banks focus, particularly when consumer deposits are used to
partake in the investment activity.110
Section 16 of the now-repealed Glass-Steagall legislation, which
describes four provisions of the United States Banking Act of 1933
separating commercial and investment banking, 111 focuses on the major
divide that famously separates the retail and investment banking functions of
a bank.112 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh), which codifies section 16 of United
States Banking Act of 1933, states:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the association shall be
limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse,
solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for
Title III allowed the secretary of the treasury to determine whether a bank needed
additional funds to operate and ‘with the approval of the President request the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation to subscribe to the preferred stock in such
association, State bank or trust company, or to make loans secured by such stock as
collateral.’
Title IV gave the Federal Reserve the flexibility to issue emergency currency—Federal
Reserve Bank Notes—backed by any assets of a commercial bank.
Title V made the act effective.
Stephen Greene, Emergency Banking Act of 1933, FED. RESERVE HISTORY, https://www
.federalreservehistory.org/essays/emergency_banking_act_of_1933 (citing Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis. “Documents and Statements Pertaining to the Banking Emergency, Presidential
Proclamations, Federal Legislation, Executive Orders, Regulations, and Other Documents and
Official Statements, Part 1, February 25 - March 31, 1833.” 1933, https://fraser.stlouisfed
.org/scribd/?item_id=23564&filepath=/docs/historical/federal%20reserve%20history/bank_holida
y/bank_emerg_pt1_19330225.pdfOffsite link.).
107. McDonald, supra note 105.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. John S. Zieser, Security Under the Glass-Steagall Act: Analyzing the Supreme Court’s
Framework for Determining Permissible Bank Activity, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1194, 1195–96
(1985).
111. David H. Carpenter and Maureen M. Murphy, Permissible Securities Activities of
Commercial Banks Under the Glass–Steagall Act (GSA) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),
Congressional Research Service Report (R41181) (April 12, 2010), https://web.archive.
org/web/20120804064833/http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41181_20100412.pdf
(“1999’s
landmark financial services legislation, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), repealed certain
provisions of the Banking Act of 1933, commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA).”).
112. Roberta Karmel, Glass-Steagall: Some Critical Reflections, 97 BANKING L. J. 631, 632
(1980).
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its own account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of
securities of stock; Provided, That the association may purchase for its own
account investment securities under such limitations and restrictions as the
Comptroller of the Currency may by regulation prescribe. . . . The
limitations and restrictions herein contained as to dealing in, underwriting
and purchasing for its own account, investment securities shall not apply to
obligations of the United States, or general obligations of any State or of
any political subdivision thereof . . .113

This section applies to national banks and state banks through the Federal
Reserve Act. 114 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) stated
that banks are not subject to the Glass-Steagall separation restrictions if the
particular restricted securities activities are carried out through a subsidiary
instead of the parent company bank.115 This leaves room for a loophole for
proxy advisory firms if a Glass-Steagall structure is adopted. A proxy
advisory firm could decide to only have its consulting business come from a
subsidiary instead of from the parent company.116
Section 20 of the now defunct Glass-Steagall Act stated:
After one year from June 16, 1933, no member bank shall be affiliated in
any manner described in subsection (b) of section 221a of this title117 with
113. 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (West) (1982) (emphasis added).
114. The Federal Reserve Act, codified in 12 U.S.C.A. § 335 (West 1999): Dealing in investment
securities; limitations and conditions, effectively states:
State member banks shall be subject to the same limitations and conditions with respect to the
purchasing, selling, underwriting, and holding of investment securities and stock as are applicable
in the case of national banks under paragraph “Seventh” of section 24 of this title. This section shall
not apply to any interest held by a State member bank in accordance with section 24a of this title
and subject to the same conditions and limitations provided in such section.
115. See FDIC, Statement of Policy on Applicability of Glass-Steagall Act to Securities Activities
of Subsidiaries of Insured Nonmember Banks, 47 Fed. Reg. 38,984 (1982).
116. See Id.
117. 12 U.S.C.A. § 221a (West 1982) defines an FRS member “affiliate” and states:
(b) Except where otherwise specifically provided, the term “affiliate” shall include any corporation,
business trust, association, or other similar organization—
(1) Of which a member bank, directly or indirectly, owns or controls either a majority of the voting
shares or more than 50 per centum of the number of shares voted for the election of its directors,
trustees, or other persons exercising similar functions at the preceding election, or controls in any
manner the election of a majority of its directors, trustees, or other persons exercising similar
functions; or
(2) Of which control is held, directly or indirectly, through stock ownership or in any other manner,
by the shareholders of a member bank who own or control either a majority of the shares of such
bank or more than 50 per centum of the number of shares voted for the election of directors of such
bank at the preceding election, or by trustees for the benefit of the shareholders of any such bank;
or
(3) Of which a majority of its directors, trustees, or other persons exercising similar functions are
directors of any one member bank; or
(4) Which owns or controls, directly or indirectly, either a majority of the shares of capital stock of
a member bank or more than 50 per centum of the number of shares voted for the election of
directors of a member bank at the preceding election, or controls in any manner the election of a
majority of the directors of a member bank, or for the benefit of whose shareholders or members all
or substantially all the capital stock of a member bank is held by trustees.
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any corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organization
engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or
distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of
stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities . . .118

This section covers all banks, including Federal Reserve System-member
state banks, that are “principally engaged” in providing securities services.119
Section 21 of Glass-Steagall states that any business that is “engaged in
the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or
retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or
other securities” cannot engage in commercial banking as well.120 Because of
this new rule, banks had to choose one function or the other, and they could
not participate in both securities trading and taking in consumer deposits.121
Section 32 prevents interlocking of management by stating that no person
“shall serve the same time as an officer, director, or employee of any member
bank.”122 At the time of enacting Glass-Steagall in the aftermath of the 1929
stock market crash, Congress was concerned about the potential conflicts of
interest in having the same management team in charge of both functions.123
For example, Congress thought it may be difficult for management of a retail
bank to extend credit impartially and simultaneously advise on investments
impartially because, in theory, managers could be tempted to (1) “favor
customers who borrowed funds to purchase securities from investment
affiliates, and (2) to promote securities offered by investment affiliates to
bank customers and correspondent banks.”124
118. 12 U.S.C.A. § 377 (West) (repealed 1999).
119. Norton, supra note 104, at 328.
120. 12 U.S.C. § 378, which is the codification of § 21, states:
(a) After the expiration of one year after June 16, 1933, it shall be unlawful—
(1) For any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organization,
engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or
through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at
the same time to any extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits . . . Provided, That the
provisions of this paragraph shall not prohibit national banks or State banks or trust companies
(whether or not members of the Federal Reserve System) or other financial institutions or private
bankers from dealing in, underwriting, purchasing, and selling investment securities, or issuing
securities, to the extent permitted to national banking associations by the provisions of section 24
of this title . . .
121. Norton, supra note 104, at 332.
122. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1982), which is the codification of § 32, provides:
No officer, director, or employee of any corporation or unincorporated association, no partner or
employee of any partnership, and no individual, primarily engaged in the issue, flotation,
underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation,
of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities, shall serve the same time as an officer, director, or
employee of any member bank except in limited classes of cases in which the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System may allow such service by general regulations when in the judgment
of the said Board it would not unduly influence the investment policies of such member bank or the
advice it gives its customers regarding investments (repealed 1999).
123. Norton, supra note 104, at 333-34.
124. Id.
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Congress ultimately repealed Glass-Steagall in 1999, due to many factors
that rendered Glass-Steagall practically ineffective.125 By the 1980’s, section
20 of Glass-Steagall became ineffective when the Federal Reserve provided
guidance on what is considered to be “principally engaged” in the securities
business. 126 Bank Holding Companies (BHC) 127 were only allowed to
partake in limited investment banking activities through subsidiaries that
were separate capitalized from the holding company, which eventually
become known as “Section 20 subsidiaries.”128 By 1999, the Federal Reserve
approved forty-one Section 20 subsidiaries and allowed them to underwrite
and perform other limited investment banking activities.129 As more Federal
Reserve decisions blurred the lines of Glass-Steagall, more investment
banking activities were permitted.130 Eventually in 1997 Bankers Trust (then
owned by Deutsche Bank) became the first U.S. bank to acquire a securities
firm (focused primarily on investment banking activities) with the purchase
of Alex Brown & Company. 131 Additionally, the Federal Reserve relaxed
other Glass-Steagall firewalls, such as allowing directors to be a part of the
parent company and subsidiary and allowing more intercompany
transactions.132 These “blurred lines” of Glass-Steagall paved the way for the
inevitable Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.133
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed sections 20 and 32 of GlassSteagall.134 It allowed for commercial banks and investment banks to affiliate
with each other and allowed overlapping management relationships between
consumer banks and securities firms. 135 However, section 16 of GlassSteagall,136 which prohibits banks from underwriting securities or engaging

125. McDonald, supra note 105.
126. Id.
127. A bank holding company (“BHC”) is “a corporation that owns a controlling interest in one
or more banks but does not itself offer banking services.” These holding companies do not focus on
the day-to-day operations of the bank, but they do have discretion over strategy and management.
All bank holding companies are regulated by the Federal Reserve. Julia Kagan, Bank Holding
Company, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/one-bank-holding-company.asp
(last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
128. McDonald, supra note 105.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Gramm–Leach–Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub.L. No. 106–102, 113 Stat.
1338 (Nov. 12, 1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, 16 and 18 U.S.C.).
134. The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act did not allow banks to offer all securities products, nor did it
allow securities firms to take deposits. It implemented a new form of BHC called a financial holding
company, which allowed the parent holding companies of banks to also include investment bank
and insurance subsidiaries. Additionally, if a bank invests into its investment bank (i.e., securities
firm) subsidiary, it cannot be recorded as an asset on the balance sheet. McDonald, supra note 105.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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in proprietary trading,137 and section 21, which prohibits broker-dealers from
accepting consumer deposits,138 were not repealed.139
III. RECOMMENDATION
This Note proposes that the solution to the potential conflict of interest
in proxy advisory firms can be solved by applying a similar Glass-Steagall
framework that splits the consulting functions and voting advisory functions.
A financial market observer in Martin Mayer’s book, The Bankers: a Major
Exploration of the Great World of Modern Banking, stated, “[i]n 1933, the
Glass-Steagall Act forbade commercial banks to own common stock or to
underwrite and sell stock or corporate bonds to their customers or depositors;
and the banks slowly, grumblingly, returned to banking.” 140 In this case,
when a Glass-Steagall framework is applied to proxy advisory firms, they
will “slowly, grumblingly” return to their main function: shareholder voting
advisory.141
A. FRAMEWORK RATIONALE COMPARISONS
Section 21 of Glass-Steagall forced banks to choose investment banking
functions or retail banking functions, and prohibited banks from performing
both functions.142 By preventing investment banks from taking on consumer
deposits, the risk of obtaining runnable debt was mitigated, therefore
reducing the chances of another bank “panic.” 143 Similarly, applying a
section 21-like concept to proxy advisory firms would force these firms to
choose either shareholder proxy voting advisory or consulting services.144
These firms will have sole discretion on which business they choose to
pursue.
Just as section 32 of Glass-Steagall helped resolve the conflicts of interest
that arise with having the same management team for the different functions
of a bank, a similar concept could resolve potential conflicts of interests that
may arise with having the same management team of a proxy advisory firm’s
consulting function and its voting advisory function.145 In enacting Glass137. Id. “Proprietary trading” refers to the act of trading financial products such as foreign
exchange currencies, commodities, bonds and stocks, with the firm’s own money by leveraging the
firm’s own assets to support the risky activities. See Proprietary Trading: What It Is & Related
Strategies, DAY TRADE WORLD, https://www.daytradetheworld.com/trading-blog/proprietarytrading-your-complete-guide/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
138. 12 U.S.C. § 378.
139. See McDonald, supra note 105.
140. MARTIN MAYER, THE BANKERS: A MAJOR EXPLORATION OF THE GREAT WORLD OF
MODERN BANKING, 52 (1974).
141. See id.
142. See 12 U.S.C. § 378, which is the codification of § 21.
143. John Crawford, A Better Way to Revive Glass-Steagall, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 2
(2017).
144. See 12 U.S.C. § 378, which is the codification of § 21.
145. See 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1982), which is the codification of § 32 (repealed 1999).
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Stegall, Congress repeatedly worried about the “subtle hazards that arise
when a commercial bank goes beyond the business of acting as fiduciary or
managing agent and enters the investment banking business either directly or
by establishing an affiliate to hold and sell particular investments.”146 One of
the most important “subtle hazards” that could stem from banks performing
both functions is the potential of loss of customer good will. 147 Just as
Congress worried that consumer bank depositors might rely on the
relationship it has with a banker to purchase bad investment products when
it passed Glass-Steagall, a similar possibility exists today with proxy
advisory firms.148 In banking, “pressures are created because the bank and
the affiliate are closely associated in the public mind, and should the affiliate
fare badly, public confidence in the bank might be impaired.”149 Similarly, in
proxy advisory firms, and particularly with ISS, consulting services and the
voting advisory service are also closely associated in the eyes of the public.150
For banks, “public confidence is essential to the solvency of a bank, so there
might exist a natural temptation to shore up the affiliate through unsound
loans or other aid.”151 In contrast to proxy advisory firms, there might be a
natural temptation for a firm to push unnecessary consulting services on a
client that also uses the firm’s voting advisory services.152 Glass-Stegall was
implemented because of Congress’ fears that a “bank’s salesman’s interest
might impair its ability to function as an impartial source of credit.”153 A
similar framework applied to proxy advisory firms would alleviate this same
fear of impartiality that many experts and members of the public have
today.154
Congress was also concerned that bank consumer depositors would
suffer losses on their investments if they bought other banking products in
reliance on the relationship between the retail bank and the investment
securities affiliate.155 Similarly, if ISS’s clients rely on their relationship with
ISS’s proxy voting branch to also utilize ISS’s consulting branch, the
potential conflict of interest could lead to shareholders losing value. 156
Congress also feared that the promotion of investment banking services,
which rely heavily on market trends, could lead commercial banks to lend
credit to potentially unworthy customers with the hope that the loan would
influence the consumer to also purchase investment banking services—such
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Inv. Co. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971).
See 77 Cong.Rec. 4028 (remarks of Rep. Fish).
See Camp, 401 U.S. at 631.
Id.
Doyle, supra note 7.
Camp, 401 U.S. at 631.
Doyle, supra note 7.
Camp, 401 U.S. at 631.
Doyle, supra note 7.
See 77 Cong.Rec. 4028 (remarks of Rep. Fish).
Doyle, supra note 7.

516

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 15

as stocks or bonds.157 This same issue of proxy advisory firms utilizing its
voting advisory services to facilitate clients to also use its consulting services
still exists today in a similar capacity. During the process leading up to GlassSteagall in 1932, Senator Bulkley summed up the potential conflict of interest
of having the same banker fulfilling the role of investment banker and
commercial banker in a well-articulated manner:
Obviously, the banker who has nothing to sell to his depositors is much
better qualified to advice disinterestedly and to regard diligently the safety
of depositors than the banker who uses the list of depositors in his savings
department to distribute circulars concerning the advantages of this, that, or
the other investment on which the bank is to receive an originating profit or
an underwriting profit or a distribution profit or a trading profit or any
combination of such profits.158

Similarly, ISS is “better qualified to advise disinterestedly” if it does not
have a consulting service to offer and can focus solely on offering wellresearched proxy voting recommendations to increase shareholder value.159
A framework based on sections 21 and 32 of Glass-Steagall could alleviate
some of these fears.160
B. CHOOSING ONE OR THE OTHER
The Center of Executive Compensation’s 2011 report suggests the SEC
take a different approach to solve these conflicts of interests by
recommending that “the SEC should ban proxy advisory firms, or their
affiliates, from providing advisory services to institutional investors, while at
the same time providing consulting services to corporate issuers on the
matters of proxy votes.”161 This approach would essentially result in the same
outcome as a split of the consulting and advisory functions of a proxy
advisory firm and would open the market to more competition in both the
voting service and the consulting service industries.162 Regardless of what
method is chosen to split up the advisory and consulting services of the proxy
advisory firms, doing so is a step in the right direction to return power to the
average investor and to stop the conflicting operating practices of proxy
advisory firms, specifically ISS.163

157. See S.Rep.No.77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 9—10.
158. Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 156, 104 S. Ct. 2979,
2989, 82 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1984)
159. See id. [Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 156, 104 S.
Ct. 2979, 2989, 82 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1984)]
160. 12 U.S.C. § 378, which is the codification of § 21; 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1982), which is the
codification of § 32 (repealed 1999).
161. A Call for Change, supra note 44, at 85.
162. See id.
163. Patch, supra note 84.
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By forcing banks to choose one function or another, Glass-Steagall
spurned more competition in both the retail bank fields and the investment
bank fields.164 Because Glass Lewis and ISS together control about thirtyeight percent of shareholder votes, they have become so influential that some
experts have proxy advisory firms as on the same level as regulators,
specifically relating to effectiveness in swinging proxy votes.165 Though they
do not technically have any statutory authority, proxy advisory firms can
swing proxy votes by as much as thirty percent.166
In the 2007 Government Accountability Office report, the government
stated that:
[B]ecause of its dominance and perceived market influence, corporations
may feel obligated to be more responsive to requests from ISS for
information about proposals than they might be to other, less established
proxy advisory firms, resulting in a greater level of access by ISS to
corporate information that might not be available to other firms.167

Some of the largest barriers of entry for smaller proxy advisory firms are
matching the extensive services provided by the large players in the industry,
along with “the development, implementation and maintenance of
sophisticated technology platforms; and the costs for clients of switching vote
execution services.”168 Proxy Governance Inc., a former ISS competitor who
was bought out by Glass Lewis, wrote a letter to the SEC outlining its
concerns about possible antitrust issues by stating:
[i]f there is one issue on which virtually all market participants (with the
possible exception of RiskMetrics/ISS) would seem to agree, it is that there
should be more than one proxy advisor and that the perpetuation of the near
monopoly status of RiskMetrics/ISS is not in the long-term interests of
investors or our capital markets.169

One could argue that Glass-Steagall stopped retail and commercial banks
from providing investment banking activities, therefore protecting Wall
Street banks like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Goldman Sachs from

164. See Gillian B. White and Bourree Lam, Could Reviving a Defunct Banking Rule Prevent a
Future Crisis?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/
glass-steagall/496856/.
165. Ike Brannon, Diminishing the Power of Proxy Advisory Firms, FORBES (July 11, 2019, 8:11
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ikebrannon/2019/07/11/diminishing-the-power-of-proxyadvisory-firms/#78f158e9452c.
166. Id.
167. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-765, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER
MEETINGS: ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY
VOTING 13 (2007).
168. A Call for Change, supra note 44, at 77.
169. Letter from Michael Ryan, Jr., President & Chief Operating Officer, Proxy Governance, to
Meagan Thompson-Mann, Millstein Inst. for Corporate Governance & Performance 7 (July 23,
2008), https://www.proxygovernance.com/content/pgi/img/2008MillsteinResponse.pdf.
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other competition, which allowed those investment banks to increase their
influence.170
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS
One of the main arguments against further regulation for proxy advisory
firms is that they are not as powerful as critics believe.171 Additionally, critics
of regulations say that further regulating proxy advisory firms will not do
much anyway because most of the proposed regulations focus on more
disclosure and transparency around the methodology of their
recommendations. 172 They argue that further regulation will drive up the
costs of their services, making institutional investor clients less likely to use
their services.173 They argue that proxy advisory firms reduce the expenses
for institutional investors in regards to research, development, and workflow
management.174
This argument against further regulation of proxy advisory firms hinges
on what “corporate purposes” institutions should focus on.175 One vision of
corporate purposes states that a business is a “vehicle for long-term value
creation,” and that “value” does not necessarily only include purely financial
terms, but also includes social prosperity.176 The competing view is that the
purpose of a corporation and the purpose of a shareholder vote is wealthmaximization because that is the most likely way an investment advisor
representing thousands of shareholders can come close to representing the
preferences of their individual investors.177 The idea is that driving up proxy
advisory costs would be a detriment to shareholders.178 The main worry here
is that proxy advisory firms may turn America’s large corporations into
“vehicles for social engineering” and may force businesses from continuing
to maximize the wealth of the shareholder, arguably the largest trigger of the
U.S. economic growth. 179 However, proxy advisory firms give a voice to
those who want to stand up to excessive compensation of executives and of

170. White, supra note 164.
171. Stephen Gandel, SEC Should Leave Proxy Advisory Firms Alone, BLOOMBERG OP. (Dec.
10, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-12-10/sec-should-leaveproxy-advisory-firms-alone.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. David Katz and Laura McIntosh, Proxy Voting and the Future of Corporations, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 30, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/30/
proxy-voting-and-the-future-of-corporations/.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Stephen Gandel, SEC Should Leave Proxy Advisory Firms Alone, BLOOMBERG OP.
(Dec. 10, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-12-10/sec-shouldleave-proxy-advisory-firms-alone.
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boards of directors. 180 Additionally, corporations tend to win shareholder
votes regardless of what the proxy advisory firm recommends, so further
regulation might not be as necessary.181
CONCLUSION
Proxy advisory firms have greatly reduced the time and money that
institutional investors182 need to spend.183 However, given the dual-nature of
these proxy advisory firms providing both consulting services and voting
advisory services to the same companies, the potential for conflicts of
interests has increased.184 This Note proposes that to avoid these conflicts of
interests, Congress should apply the Glass-Steagall framework that will split
up these proxy advisory firms, forcing these established firms to choose
consulting services or advisory services, but not both.185 Doing so will reduce
conflicts of interests and produce more competition within the proxy advisory
market.
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